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Seeing Differences Differently: Peter Best and Morally Relevant Differences1
Sandra Tomsons
Bio: Sandra Tomsons, Ph.D., Research Affiliate, Centre for Health Care Ethics, Lakehead University and
Co-Editor of the Canadian Journal of Practical Philosophy. My research focus is ethical/just relationships.
Currently, I am studying three unethical relationships: 1) Canada’s colonial relationships with Indigenous
Peoples; 2) European nations’ past/present colonial relationships, and 3) Western societies’ unethical/ unjust
and unhealthy relationships with Earth, locally and wholistically. I study these relationships in terms of two
desiderata: i) what ethical/just relationships look like and ii) how unethical/unjust relationships could become
ethical.
Abstract : Recently, I benefited from reflecting on Best’s arguments in There is no Difference. Accepting
his argument chain to establish that there is no difference between individual Indigenous persons 2 and
European persons, we agree that Indigenous persons and Europeans have the same humanity, moral worth
and individual moral human rights. Hence, we agree that Indigenous persons in Canada should legally have
equal human rights.3 The moral difference Best sees, and I no longer see, is between Indigenous nations and
European nations. For Best, differences between nations can make one nation superior to another.
Challenging Best’s superior-inferior-nation hierarchy, I argue that liberal theory assigns normative status to
a difference between Canada and Indigenous Nations which justifies Best’s normative judgment, “The
nation-to-nation treaty relationship is a fiction.” However, I show that the nation in the nation-to-nation
relationship is Canada.
Keywords: Aboriginal rights, Peter Best, Colonial-Perceptual-Reality Cave, Tom Flanagan, Will Kymlicka,
Lorraine Mayer, nation-to-nation treaty relationship, Plato, Dale Turner, Francis Widdowson, James
(Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson

My objectives in the following are to show that:
1. Peter Best’s arguments to prove that Indigenous nations are not nations are invalid and
hence unsound.
2. The starting point of Best’s argument to justify his proposal for a just resolution to
‘Canada’s Aboriginal problem’, that is, “Canada is a nation,” is false.
3. I see moral differences on Turtle Island Best cannot see because of my ongoing dialogue
with Indigenous scholars. They helped me discover colonial-perceptual-reality and the
Colonial-perceptual-reality-Cave. Best and I were both born into this Cave. With their
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assistance, I now think about normative reality on Turtle Island, not the artificial constructs
(shadows on The Cave wall) about which Best is thinking.

Introduction

I write this compelled by my hardwiring, by my conscience, by my wish not to die with
the ‘awful knowledge’ ... that I didn’t speak up as a call to ordinary Canadians (including
Indian Canadians) to overcome their natural fears and speak up on this crucial issue and-as much or more for the best interests of Indian Canadians--to start demanding that this
occur.
Peter Best4

Peter Best’s words could be mine. We are equally passionate about what he calls Indians’
“intractable problems” or “the troubled situation of our Indigenous peoples.” I call this reality the
“systemic injustice of colonialism” or “ongoing violation of Indigenous Peoples’ rights to
sovereignty and land” (Tomsons, 2013.2, 2019). Our passion and focus on justice notwithstanding,
we see Canada and First Nations differently. When I began writing this paper, I intended to
challenge Best’s claim that the nation-to-nation treaty relationship is a fiction. My presentations
and publications prior to reading Best argued that Canada has a duty to establish the just nationto-nation treaty relationship as requested by Indigenous politicians and scholars and recommended
by The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP). However, in writing this
paper, I discovered that I agree with Best. The treaty relationship is a nation-to-nation relationship.
I thank Best for helping me discover that, for many years, my argument chains have been that there
is a non-nation in the nation-to-nation treaty relationship.
I have established the following conclusions:
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Canada’s exercise of sovereignty, hence underlying title, is unjust since it cannot possess

these rights legally/morally (Mayer & Tomsons, 2013; Tomsons, 2013.2 & 2019).
2.

Because Indigenous Peoples never transferred their inherent (sui generis) legal/moral

rights to sovereignty, only Indigenous Peoples have legal/moral rights to sovereignty on Turtle
Island (Mayer & Tomsons, 2013; Tomsons, 2013.2).
3.

Therefore, Canada is an illegitimate nation on Turtle Island.

4.

Therefore, Canada is fundamentally unjust.

If I am challenging Canada’s sovereignty and legitimacy, am I not contesting its
nationhood, and, hence, the nation-to-nation relationship? If Indigenous Peoples are the only
sovereigns on Turtle Island, because they haven’t transferred their sovereignty to any European
nation or Canada, there is a nation in what I have presumed is a nation-to-nation relationship.
According to liberal theory’s origin-of-nation story and justice principles, what we call Canada is
really Canada. Unless/until Indigenous nations make Canada legitimate, the treaty relationship
Indigenous and non-Indigenous politicians and scholars talk about is not between nations. Until
Indigenous Peoples confer legitimacy upon Canada, its exercise of sovereignty is the exercise of
brute force and unjust rule.
In what follows, I explain the normative differences underlying the radically different ways

in which Best and I see Canada and Indigenous nations. I begin by establishing our shared starting
points in liberal theory’s principle of equality of humans and the belief that all human beings have
the same human rights. I show that we part company when Best applies the Eurocentric inferiorsuperior dichotomy to aggregates of persons, thereby creating an inferior-superior-nation
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hierarchy.5 Using the naturalistic fallacy, I show that individual arguments in his argument chain
are invalid, in which case the chain is unsound.
In the last section of the paper, I use Lorraine Mayer’s notion of perceptual reality and
Plato’s analogy of the Cave to explain why Best and his experts, like most non-Indigenous
scholars, keep providing unjust solutions to what they call “Canada’s Aboriginal problem.” I show
why they cannot see and will resist seeing Turtle Island and Canada. Canada’s legitimacy is the
automatic starting point for legal/political discourse about justice and reconciliation, although it is
presumed rather than stated. I also show that, unless Canada becomes our starting point in this
discourse, we engage normative-shadow-based thinking which endlessly creates new costumes for
colonialism.
Confident that Peter Best and most scholars seeking solutions to colonialism on Turtle
Island want justice to prevail, I hope that exposing the source and content of much of our
misunderstanding of normative reality on Turtle Island will convince them to switch from
passionately persuading Indigenous persons to assimilate to passionately persuading Canada to
negotiate with Indigenous Peoples from sea-to-sea-to-sea to create Canada. This will transform
our fictional treaty relationship into a just nation-to-nation treaty relationship and all people on
Turtle Island can be trained to respect the reformulated sovereignty and land rights of Peoples
living on Turtle Island.

Inferior-Superior Hierarchies

Best and I base our questions and argue for our recommendations in the context of liberal
theory’s notions of justice. Justice being our goal, justice principles, specifically notions of rights
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(individual and collective), provide normative support for the justice problems we see and our
solutions. Best primarily uses equality and proposes establishing an equal human rights regime in
Canada. This would replace Canada’s failed implementation of Section 35 Aboriginal Peoples
inherent and treaty rights. Agreeing with Best that Canada’s present nation-to-nation treaty
approach is failing and unjust, and that Canada doesn’t understand recognizing Aboriginal rights,
I reject his solution. Assimilation for Indians, Best’s equal Canadians justice solution, creates only
more injustice for everyone. Basing my justice proposal on Indigenous Peoples’ collective human
rights and proving Canada’s collective human rights are very unlike the rights it exercises, I
propose non-Indigenous people ask Indigenous nations whether we can transform our nation-tonation treaty relationship into a just nation-to-nation treaty relationship.
I accept the uncontroversial normative premises Best used to establish that Indians are
equal to other Canadians:

1.

All human beings are equal.

2.

There is no moral difference between Indians and non-Indians.

3.

Neither Indians nor non-Indians have more or superior human rights.

I also agree with his conclusion, following logically from these premises, namely, that “All

Canadians have the same human rights.”6 Agreeing that there is no hierarchy of persons (micro
level), we disagree about there being a hierarchy of nations (macro level). Best argues for an
inferior-superior hierarchy of nations. However, I show that he provides no justification for
claiming that this hierarchy exists.

5

CJPP, Volume 7, 2021

Seeing Differences Differently: Peter Best and Morally Relevant Differences

Sandra Tomsons

As I explain in the next section, Best rejects the notion and existence of Indian Nations
because he accepts illicit arguments by political scientists (Tom Flanagan, Frances Widdowson),
a Supreme Court judge (USA Chief Justice John Marshall)7, and an historian (Peter Heather).8
Best’s experts’ arguments are infected by the naturalistic fallacy, thereby making every link in his
argument chain invalid and hence unsound.

The Inferior-Superior Nations Hierarchy

To justify his claim that First Nations are inferior and European nations and Canada are
superior, Best quotes social scientists who assert or presume an inferior-superior-nation hierarchy.
However, none of his quotations or paraphrases justifies asserting that the hierarchy exists. Peter
Heather’s descriptions of European and Indian aggregate groups do not prove that nations fitting
one set of descriptions are inferior or superior.9 Inferior-superior judgments, that is, normative
claims, cannot be proven by lists of descriptions, no matter how long the lists. Leaving aside the
problem of false claims in Heather’s lists,10 and that Best apparently sees no problem in the fact
that several of the descriptions of superior nations imply that these nations are unjust,11 the biggest
problem for Best’s theory is inherited from his academic experts. No one proves that European
nations are superior to Indigenous nations. To the extent that Heather’s descriptions are true, they

prove that European and Indigenous nations were/are different. Showing that Tom and Betty
differ, however, does not prove that one is inferior/superior to the other.
Best, following his experts, makes no effort to show why/how one set of characteristics
make a nation superior and the other makes a nation inferior. White, of European ancestry, and
socialized to value features of the nation into which they are born, European nations,
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unsurprisingly, are regarded as superior. However, their preference for Canada over an Indigenous
nation cannot provide the basis for claiming that Indigenous nations are nations. Similarly, their
preference is not a good reason for claiming that Canada is more-developed/superior.
There is nothing wrong, in principle, with Best, Flanagan, Widdowson and Heather valuing
characteristics of Canada more. However, their valuing and disvaluing cannot serve as standalone premises for their arguments. Their values cannot prove that European nations are superior
any more than Indigenous people valuing more the characteristics of Indigenous nations can prove
that their nations are superior. Examining Best’s argument chain, he appears to presume that the
superiority of European-type nations is self-evident. Whether looking at Heather’s list, Flanagan’s
civilized/uncivilized comparison, or surveying a First Nation community, he cannot imagine any
rational person preferring to live in a First Nation, if living in Canada were an option. Since
Indigenous persons, whom Best is presuming are rational humans, and I, a non-Indigenous human
being, would prefer to live in a First Nation, Best’s appeal to self-evident truth does not work. It
is reasonable to ask him to justify his normative premises, and that is what I am doing here.

Social Darwinism and the Inferior-Superior Nations Hierarchy

In Progress: Its Law and Cause, published two years before Darwin’s On the Origins of

Species, philosopher Herbert Spencer applied evolutionary theory’s notions of natural selection
and survival of the fittest to human development. 12 By the end of WW2, Spencer’s Social
Darwinist theory was discredited by biologists and sociologists. 13 His philosophical theory
provides the building blocks upon which Flanagan and Widdowson construct purportedly
scientific theories of Aboriginal rights.14 Flanagan claimed, and Widdowson and Best concur,
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that, at first contact, Indians were uncivilized, living in a Hobbesian state of nature, not political
societies (Flanagan, 2000). On the basis of Flanagan’s three normative claims (declared true but
not proven true), Best makes these normative claims:

1. There are no First Nations.
2. There never was a nation-to-nation treaty relationship between First Nations and
France or Britain.
3. There isn’t a nation-to-nation treaty relationship between First Nations and Canada.

If these normative judgments are true, the treaty relationship with First Nations is a fiction.
Best confidently asserts these conclusions about Indian Nations and Canada. However, without
normative reason(s) to justify normative assertions and presumptions in Flanagan’s claim, “at first
contact, Indians were uncivilized, living in a Hobbesian state of nature, not political societies,”
Best’s argument has no empirical or normative foundation.15 As I show below, Bruce Morito’s
analysis of our historical record repudiates Hobbesian (and Lockian) stipulations which assign
Indigenous persons to a lawless State of Nature. Without a State of Nature premise, Best has no
empirical starting point for his inferior-superior hierarchy and no argument to establish that
Indigenous Peoples were/are not nations.

Social Science, Social Scientists, and Normative Judgments

Showing that Best’s normative judgments about the inferiority of First Nations are false
would require several papers. 16 However, it is easy to establish the invalidity, and hence the
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unsoundness, of his argument chain. Best’s experts are social scientists, who don’t want to be
philosophers. When they opted to become scientists, i.e., to make empirical data collected by
scientific methodologies the basis for explanation and theorizing, freshly minted “social scientists”
separated from philosophy. No longer under philosophy’s umbrella, where they lived for
thousands of years, social scientists forgot philosophy’s methodologies and the normative
questions which only philosophy’s methodologies are designed to answer.17 Accordingly, social
scientists qua scientists were no longer privy to the only methodologies the West has devised to
answer real or ideal world normative questions. In the 21st century, typically only philosophers
acquire these skills.
Since Best and his social scientists ask explicitly normative questions and create arguments
that are awash in implicit normative premises and explicit normative conclusions, they are doing
something that requires the methodologies of philosophy while construing themselves as engaged
in social science. The result is argument chains infected by the naturalistic fallacy.

Best’s Argument Chain and the Naturalistic Fallacy

Best’s argument to prove First Nations are nations uses nation comparisons. The Oxford
Dictionary provides Best with the following definition of nation:

An aggregate of persons so closely associated with each other by common descent,
language or history as to form a distinct race or people, usually organized as a separate
political state and occupying a definite territory. In early examples, the racial idea is usually
stronger than the political; in recent use, the notion of political unity and independence is
more prominent (Best, 221).18

Reporting English word usage, this definition distinguishes two types of nation. The definition is
not making normative judgments. It neither explicitly nor implicitly employs the idea of
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progressing or developing from being an inferior nation into a superior nation. It provides no
evidence for claiming that at some point an earlier type of nation stops being a nation and becomes
a nation, in which case it provides no justification for claiming Indigenous nations are nations. To
the contrary. cultural/racial aggregate groups are identified as a type of nation, mentioned precisely
because they are nations.
Best engages invisible normative reasoning when he introduces Heather’s earlier-recent
nation distinction and Flanagan’s civilized-uncivilized distinction. Earlier nations are nations in
the racial, linguistic, and people-of-common-experience sense. According to Best, Indigenous
nations only ever constituted earlier nations. Great Britain and Canada, however, signed treaties
as “...nations in the more recent political, sovereign, precisely-defined territory, “nation-state”
sense...” (Best, 221; italics mine). Without justification, the earlier-recent difference has morphed
into a qualitative normative/prescriptive difference. Earlier nations are declared/presumed
inferior/uncivilized relative to historically later superior/civilized nations.
Best presumes that Heather’s features of political states are necessary and sufficient
conditions for being a real nation, that is, a political state. He also presumes that Flanagan’s
distinction between civilized and uncivilized peoples is a real distinction which applies to
European and Indigenous peoples, making the former more developed (superior) to the latter. Best
regards the developmental difference established by Heather’s and Flanagan’s comparisons as

proving that aggregates of European humans constitute nations whereas Indigenous aggregates of
humans constitute nations. Following in the footsteps of his experts produces normative and
empirical reality gaps in Best’s argument chain. Like Heather and Flanagan, Best can only make
his argument valid by proving that an aggregate of humans must possess the features of European
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nations to be a nation, i.e., that their normative criteria for nation are necessary characteristics of
being a nation. 19
To be fair, it is unlikely that Best or his social scientist experts intended/wanted to stipulate
the necessary characteristics of a real nation based on their subjective valuing of characteristics.
Best is reading historians and political scientists who profess to be historians and political
scientists. Heather, Flanagan and Widdowson would be dismissive of any suggestion they are
constructing philosophical arguments which depend on their personal value systems for validity
and soundness. They regard their normative superior-inferior judgments as descriptive, the
conclusions of arguments based on facts discovered by scientific means. Flanagan rests his
distinction between civilized and uncivilized nations on the work of anthropologists, explicitly
stating:
‘Civilization’ as I use the term here is a factual, not a normative, concept.20 It describes a
certain type of social organization that has gradually emerged and spread around the entire
world. It is not that savagery is bad and civilization is good; both are stages of social
development that have arisen sequentially in the historical process…But, even if
civilization is a factually descriptive concept, the world-wide spread of civilization as
defined has certain moral implications. If we pretend that civilization as defined here does
not exist or that it does not absorb and replace earlier forms of society, we ignore basic
aspects of the contemporary human condition at our peril, for any political program based
on ignorance or rejection of reality is bound to fail. (Flanagan, 35)
Flanagan’s insistence that his civilized/uncivilized distinction is not normative provides
problems for his argument. I am interested in the problems his false claim creates for Best’s
argument chain. Best’s argument needs an inferior-superior-nation hierarchy. If Indigenous
Peoples are nations in an earlier stage of the development of nations, this does not give Best a basis
for claiming that Indigenous nations are nations. A nation at an earlier stage in its development is
still a nation. So, the treaty relationship between Canada and Indigenous Peoples would be a
nation-to-nation relationship. Best’s nation-nation distinction, and fictional treaty relationship,
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need comparisons which Heather and Flanagan make to imply that their preferred way of
organizing an aggregate of persons is superior to other ways an aggregate of persons organizes
itself. Since Heather and Flanagan only list differences, either they are stating preferences or
presume what they value most in a society is more valuable than what others value. What they
cannot truthfully claim is that their explicit and implicit normative judgments are descriptive.
Their nation hierarchy rests upon a set of values. In 2021, these values are widely regarded by
scholars, including anthropologists, as Eurocentric racism.
Factual problems with Heather’s comparison and Flanagan’s analysis notwithstanding,
even if accurate and descriptive, they cannot, by their very nature, justify inferior/superior
judgments. Best needs the Indigenous side of the comparison to be inferior to the European. His
argument needs these normative judgments. Citing Heather, Flanagan and Widdowson shows that
others share his values. It does not show that European-based values are superior to Indigenous
values. At the end of Best’s long book, the inferior-superior nation hierarchy remains unjustified.
His argument-chain is unsound.
Inferior-superior judgments arguably describe the world. To make them, we pass empirical
data through values, feelings, and attitudes.21 Since normative judgments attach to values, they
are problematic for social scientists. Aside from the difficulty of access to someone else’s values,
how do we determine thatthe values we assign to what we experience are appropriate? Best’s

values hide behind his normative assertions and presumptions. The values hiding behind his
comparative descriptions seem to be as invisible to him as they are to Flanagan and Widdowson.
Training in normative methodologies allows one to see the hidden normative judgments behind
Best’s conclusions which are necessary for his arguments to be valid. Only if Best were able to
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see that his normative presumptions rest on racist values/beliefs, which he rejected when he
claimed that all humans are equal, would he be able to discern the untenability of his position.

Best’s Case Study: Anishnabek ‘Nation’ and the HST22

After thinking that he has established that Indigenous nations are nations, Best uses an
example of Indigenous Nations claiming nationhood and sovereignty to illustrate the absurdity and
terrible consequences of Indians believing that they are nations. He analyses the Anishnabek
Nation’s response to Ontario’s imposition of the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST).23 The Anishnabek
Nation argued that the HST cannot apply to its citizens for the following reasons:

1.

Treaty relationships with the Crown reflect First Nations sovereignty as Nations.

2.

First Nations never relinquished nor surrendered sovereignty to governments of

France, Britain, Canada, or provinces.
Therefore,
Conclusion 1: First Nations are not subjects of the Crown.
Conclusion 2: First Nations citizens don’t have to pay taxes to the government of another
nation.
Conclusion 3: First Nations are exempt from the HST, unilaterally imposed by another
government.

Arguing that their reasoning is nonsensical, Best blames the Anishnabek Nation’s HST
challenge on Indian leaders propagating
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... the general falsehood that the treaties their forebearers entered into with Canada were
the result of ‘nation-to-nation’ dealings, in the sense of two sovereign, independent nationstates entering into a treaty agreement and then--subject to the carrying out of the treaty
obligations incurred--carrying on as before on their own sovereign, independent tracks…
The Indian industry propagates ‘this false, even mythological, historical view of the
original treaties’ (Best, 218-219).

For Best, the Chiefs’ argument rests on myth/fiction. Falsely believing he has proven
Indigenous nations are nations and the treaty relationship is a fiction, Best asserts that the first
premise of the immunity argument is false. If it is false, First Nations had no sovereignty to
transfer, so premise 2 is a meaningless assertion. If premises 1 and 2 are false, so are the 3
conclusions inferred from them.
Best’s chapter on “The Myth of Nation-to-Nation Dealings” contains his argument for
proving the treaty relationship is fiction/myth. The dictionary definition, Heather’s features of
political states, and a quotation from a column by Globe and Mail columnist Jeffrey Simpson
provide the content for his argument. Two sentences from Simpson’s piece suffice to show the
tenor of Best’s argument:
The royal commission on aboriginal affairs, established by the Mulroney government, took
up the cause of these “nations” and designed an entire parallel political superstructure of
“nation-to-nation” dealings. That the majority of these nations had fewer people than a
small Saskatchewan town and that many of the members had drifted into cities, did not
seem to matter within the commissioners’ dream palaces (Best 225).

Simpson feeds Best’s confidence that
Modern Indian leaders propagate the general falsehood that the treaties their forefathers
entered into with Canada were the result of “nation-to-nation” dealings, in the sense of two
sovereign, independent nation-states entering into a treaty agreement and then—subject to
the carrying out of the treaty obligations incurred—carrying on as before on their own
sovereign, independent tracks (Best, 281).
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I won’t address misleading claims and innuendo in Simpson’s column. Space only permits
gesturing in the direction of several problems with Best’s dismissal of Indian leaders’ assertions
about treaties based on Simpson’s dismissal of the notion of Indigenous nations.

1.

Do Indigenous politicians propagate falsehoods about nation-to-nation treaties?

Indian leaders, ancient and modern, agree with OED’s definition of treaty: a formal
agreement between two or more countries. OED’s definition of country: the most usual,
neutral word for a geographical area that has or used to have its own government.
Conclusion: According to the OED, Anishabek Nation’s leaders are not propagating
falsehoods. They are in a nation-to-nation treaty relationship.

2.

Do Indigenous politicians propagate falsehoods about a treaty relationship between

“two sovereign, independent nation-states entering into a treaty agreement and then-subject to the carrying out of the treaty obligations incurred--carrying on as before on their
own sovereign, independent tracks?”

Best denies Indigenous nations nationhood and hence sovereignty. However, he believes
that Canada is a sovereign nation because Britain transferred sovereignty to Canada at
confederation. This raises the question: Where did Britain’s sovereignty come from? As the
Anishinabek Nation’s Chiefs explained, their ancestors never relinquished nor surrendered
sovereignty. So how did Britain become a legitimate sovereign on Turtle Island? Britain did not
satisfy liberal theory’s justice requirements for a legitimate sovereign by simply declaring and
exercising sovereignty. According to liberal theory, a People or people have the right to self-
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determination. Therefore, anyone exercising the legitimate right to rule over a People would have
to have obtained their free and informed consent.
Liberal theory requires that sovereigns respect other sovereigns. It does not differentiate
between inferior/superior nations, giving the superior the right to rule inferior nations. European
nations at first contact and beyond treated Indigenous Peoples across Turtle Island as if they were
nations. Even if Indigenous nations were inferior, and their sovereignty were inferior, an inferior
nation would still be inhabited by self-determining people. According to the liberal theory Best
believes in, it would be racist to say that these people do not have the right to consent to be ruled
by the superior nation.

The Moral Difference Best Does Not See

So, how did our land get to be a country called Canada
Without our consent?...You consider us your possessions
At best; at worst we are like a personal footnote to the
Canada that is owned by Canadians. When did we ever
Agree to all this? (Maracle, 9)24
Best’s unsound argument for the conclusion, “There is a normative difference between
European and Indigenous nations,” prompted me to understand more fully the moral difference
between Indigenous nations and Canada which I see. I see Canada. Best sees Canada. Rejecting
his inferior-superior-nation hierarchy and dismissing his unsound arguments for claiming
Indigenous nations are nations, I nevertheless agree with Best that the nation-to-nation treaty
relationship between Indigenous nations and Canada is a fiction. This is not because one nation in
the relationship is superior to the other. It is because there is only one nation in the relationship.
Because Indigenous nations are nations, their legitimacy challenges the legitimacy of any country
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Europeans believed they could create by declarations or passing laws in Europe. Canada could
only exist as a nation as the result of negotiations with Indigenous Peoples in which they consented
to share their land with self-determining peoples. Although Indigenous Peoples were and are
willing to share their land and be in a treaty relationship characterized by mutual respect and just
processes and distribution of benefits and burdens, they have made it very clear for decades that
they have never and will never agree to the existence of Canada. It is an illegitimate fiction/myth,
to use Best’s notions, unlawfully exercising sovereignty rights Canada does not have and violating
sovereignty rights Indigenous Peoples do have.
Declarations and laws can no more create and build a legitimate nation on top of Indigenous
nations on Turtle Island than ongoing violations of Indigenous nations’ sovereignty and forced
removal of Indigenous Peoples from their land. Canada’s Constitution, Indian Act, Prime
Ministers, Cabinet Ministers, and legal institutions are also equally powerless to create or build a
legitimate nation where legitimate nations exist and protest these actions.

Discovering Canada

In 2006, Dale Turner (Anishinaabe, citizen of Temagami First Nation and the United
Kingdom) in This is Not A Peace Pipe introduced me to the legitimacy of Canada problem. I had

been researching Aboriginal rights since 1995, so was familiar with the work of Flanagan, Cairns,
James Tully and Will Kymlicka. At the CPA’s Aboriginal Rights conference in 2001, I had the
opportunity to listen to many Indigenous scholars and Elders provide an account of the history of
the relationships between European and Indigenous Peoples on Turtle Island that I never before
encountered.

25

They explained their understanding of Aboriginal rights, sovereignty,
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responsibility, and the treaty relationship. I had known for some time that European nations and
Canada violated and were violating Aboriginal rights. However, like all non-Indigenous scholars
I knew, I never drew the dots between what they did and the legitimacy of Canada question.
Reading Dale’s analysis and critique of several non-Indigenous proposals for just resolution of the
Aboriginal problem (Trudeau’s White Paper, Cairns’ citizens plus, and Will Kymlicka’s minority
nations), I discovered that they all not only all presumed the legitimacy of Canada, but, like me,
they did not seem to know that they were doing it.26
The White Paper does not provide the historical background Flanagan, Cairns, and
Kymlicka afford. However, situating their thinking in non-Indigenous injustices, past or present,
does not prevent them from repeating its mistake. They ignore the legitimacy of Canada problem,
something which is implied by their historical accounts when analyzing Canada’s most significant
justice problem and proposing solutions. Like Canada’s proposals for Aboriginal rights generally,
other than making justice their goal, these authors treat the specifics of the historical account as
irrelevant to the normative starting point for their thinking. They do not see that Canada’s
legitimacy is challenged by Europe’s and Canada’s actions and omissions. They do not
comprehend the implications of Indigenous Peoples’ understanding of their rights and Canada’s
rights. Canada’s legitimacy is the invisible normative presumption in all their legal/ political
discourse about Aboriginal rights. As Turner showed me, if one asks the legitimacy question,

eventually, if not immediately, one discovers that presumptive legitimacy cannot be justified.
This seems to put me at odds with many non-Indigenous politicians and scholars and
perhaps even some Indigenous politicians and scholars, however. Agreeing with Turner means I
also agree with Best’s assessment of the treaty relationship.27 Since confederation, there hasn’t
been a nation-to-nation relationship on Turtle Island. The relationship became a fiction when
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Canada transformed a centuries-long, nation-to-nation treaty relationship, established in Peace and
Friendship treaties in L’nu and sustained in Covenant Chain treaties, into a series of nation-tonation relationships. When we began perceiving Canada as the only real nation in the treaty
process, we created Canada, thereby creating the nation-to-nation relationship. When we created
Canada, we extended our notion of a treaty relationship in which only Canada is a real nation
back in time. This meant that we began to regard the original treaties as being between a
superior/real European nation and inferior/unreal Indian nations/tribes. Ironically, when Canada
perceives and treats Indigenous nations as nations, from the perspective of liberal theory justice
theory it firmly establishes itself as the nation in the nation-to-nation relationship.

Credit Where Credit is Due

I credit Best for making explicit/visible the intentions of Canada’s politicians’ words
(spoken and written), which were invisible but which their actions/omissions reveal. Best also
facilitates seeing the implicit normative premises in the work of non-Indigenous scholars which
frequently remain invisible to readers of their publications. When politicians and scholars speak,
we often cannot tell whether they mean “nation” or nation. Hence, we do not know whether they
are saying that Canada is committed to a nation-to-nation, or a nation-to-nation, treaty relationship.

Politicians’ actions/omissions in all federal and provincial parties across Canada indicate that they
either believe that the nation-to-nation relationship is a fiction or they are intentionally exercising
sovereignty which they know is illegitimate. Tom Flanagan’s First Nations? Second Thoughts was
criticized for denying Indigenous nationhood and sovereignty. However, as Lorraine Mayer and
I explain in Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights: Critical Dialogues, every non-Indigenous scholar
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in the anthology presumes that Canada is not Canada. So, for example, while we recognize that
neither Alan Cairns nor Will Kymlicka in their discussions of Aboriginal rights wields Flanagan’s
or Widdowson’s big stick, seeing Canada’s Aboriginal problem as its most serious justice
problem, they leave no doubt that Canada is the only nation in the treaty relationship (Mayer and
Tomsons, 2013; Tomsons, 2013.2). 28 Political philosopher Will Kymlicka is the only nonIndigeneous scholar I know of who uses ‘nation’ to represent the special/different kind of nation
status of First Nations. For Kymlicka, ‘nation’ does not so much contest the reality of a centurieslong, nation-to-nation relationship, on the one hand, but rather crystalizes liberal theory’s
resistance to nations within a nation and First Nation’s minority nation status, on the other.29 In
either case, Kymlicka presumes Best’s inferior-superior nation hierarchy by implying in his
theorizing a positive answer to the “Is Canada a legitimate nation?” question. Like Best, Kymlicka
fails to justify either the presumptions supporting the inferior-superior-nation hierarchy or his
presumption that Canada is not Canada.

Unlike Best, Kymlicka does not attempt these

justifications, apparently seeing no need to do so.

The Colonial-Perceptual-Reality-Cave: Our Epistemological Predicament

Best’s confidence in his belief that ‘Indian nations ’is an oxymoron is captured in the

following:
Examining in more detail the events and circumstances surrounding the making of some
of the treaties themselves highlights and confirms that in no way was the making of the
treaties a result of political-nation-to-political-nation dealings. Also, looking at what
actually occurred when some of the treaties were signed--how and why the parties came
together, what different people actually said, looking at what some of the treaties
themselves actually say--confirms that, contrary to what Indian leaders like Chiefs
Madahbee and Day (as they then were) said, these were no ‘nation-to-nation’ dealings.
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They were pathos-filled, de facto-surrender talks between small, broken tribes of cultural
nations only, and a powerful, modern, political nation-state (Best, 227-228).

It is painful to record words so disrespectful of First Nations and their citizens. I do so because
every sentence demonstrates that Best is a prisoner in what I call the “Colonial-Perceptual-RealityCave” (The Cave). In The Cave, false and unjustified empirical statements and normative
judgments are commonplace among epistemic prisoners. So is the confidence/epistemic conceit
with which Best asserts them. Many prisoners are silent, ignoring the “Indian problem”. It attests
to Best’s passion for justice and confidence in his experts that he devotes time and work to educate
non-Indigenous and Indigenous Canadians whom he believes are misinformed and continuously
dubbed so by their politicians and pundits. In his view, Indigenous Canadians are more than
deceived. Their misconceptions cause them unnecessary harms.
In 2009, I wrote a paper criticizing Widdowson’s attack on Indigenous methodologies
based on a problematic analysis of the objective/subjective distinction and an unjustified disrespect
for traditional knowledge. In the paper, I used Plato’s Allegory of the Cave to explain the
epistemological predicament of non-Indigenous people when we think about Aboriginal Rights.
(Tomsons, 2009). Situating us in The Cave explained simultaneously our i) wanting Canada to be
just, ii) accepting the nation-to-nation treaty relationship notion, iii) not comprehending
Indigenous politicians’ and academics’ explanations of the justice problem to be resolved, and iv)

not hearing my liberal-theory-based arguments about Canada’s illegitimacy.
For as long as Canada is old, from birth, non-Indigenous children are socialized into The
Cave. 30 During Best’s childhood in The Cave, he acquired beliefs, values and attitudes consistent
with perceiving Europeans as superior to Indians. He came to perceive Canada as one of the
greatest countries in the world and to perceive Indians as people living apart from us on

21

CJPP, Volume 7, 2021

Seeing Differences Differently: Peter Best and Morally Relevant Differences

Sandra Tomsons

reservations, and having some rights the rest of Canadians do not have. During his lifetime, like
most prisoners, Best learned that Indians are not inferior humans. They have the same human rights
as non-Indians. As Best attests, although Europeans did not believe it at the time, at first contact,
one group of equal humans was meeting another group of equal humans. However, like other
prisoners, Best has failed to realize that his beliefs that, at first contact, Indians were uncivilized
savages, living in a State of Nature, that is, not nations, are false normative judgments. No one in
The Cave questions their beliefs, so no one attempts to prove that they are false. However,
Indigenous voices are now being heard in The Cave, challenging prisoners’ misconceptions about
Canada, Indigenous Peoples, sovereignty rights, and the responsibilities of sovereigns on Turtle
Island.
Having perceived that all humans are equal because they have figured out that the ways in
which we are different are morally irrelevant, prisoners like Best still regard European nations and
Canada differently from Indigenous nations. Their perceptions are still filtered through the
inferior-superior-nation lens. Best’s version of the nation-nation argument sits on the shifting
sands of this unjustified and unjustifiable hierarchy. The belief that some aggregates of equal
humans live in ways sufficiently less valuable than ours to make it rational to judge these
aggregates nations is typically unquestioned in The Cave. I commend Best for seeing that it is a
belief that requires justification. I hope I have shown him that his justification presumes FREISD

(false-racist-Eurocentric-inferior-superior-dichotomy) every step of the argument chain. If I have
done this, then I have helped Best free himself from his prisoners’ chains.
When Best is released from those chains, he will begin to understand the origins of his
FREISD beliefs, values, and attitudes. He will understand that the prisoners shared set of false
empirical and normative beliefs about Canada and Indigenous Peoples and nations creates many
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epistemological obstacles to perceiving normative reality on Turtle Island. Prisoners’ ongoing
agreement creates unshakeable confidence that their false beliefs are true and the values attending
these beliefs are unproblematic. If no one knows where we are, how do we discover this and
recognize that we are theorizing about shadows? Because those best equipped to get us out of The
Cave are Indigenous people. Western academics’ dominant epistemic disrespect for Indigenous
methodologies, hence Indigenous scholars, poses another huge stumbling block.

Indigenous Scholars Help Me Discover the Colonial-Perceptual-Reality-Cave

In 1997, I met Lorraine Mayer at the Native Philosophy Project at Lakehead Univeristy.
When we were in the university bookstore, I asked what I should buy. Lorraine’s response was
simple: “Buy Indian.” I have been following this wise advice ever since and by doing so I
encountered many Indigenous instructors who gradually helped me discover my epistemic
predicament. Dale Turner’s This is not a Peace Pipe was a significant impetus in my journey from
The Cave after Lorraine released my chains. For many years, I have had the good fortune to
collaborate with Sa’ke’j Youngblood Henderson. Sa’ke’j introduced me to the fallacy of the
inferior-superior dichotomy, providing a tool with which I could overcome many epistemological
obstacles to understanding nations, sovereignty, and land title on Turtle Island.31 As I show above

in my analysis of the theories of Best, Flanagan, Widdowson, Cairns, and Kymlicka, nonIndigenous scholars automatically use the inferior-superior dichotomy when theorizing about
Aboriginal rights. I am now skilled at identifying Canada and other FREISD-based
presuppositions in the theories of these scholars.
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Inter-Philosophy(ies) Dialogue and Escaping The Cave

In conversations (in person, e-mail, Zoom) and publications, I have dialogued with many
Indigenous scholars including Lorraine Mayer (Metis), Lee Hester (Choctaw), Dale Turner
(Anishinaabe), Paul Chartrand (Metis),

32

Taiaiake Alfred (Mohawk), Leroy Little Bear

(Blackfoot), Sa’ke’j Youngblood Henderson (Chickasaw), John Borrows (Anishinaabe) and
Robert Hamilton (Anishinaabe); Indigenous Elders including Dr. Tobasonakwut Kinew, Janice
Greene, and Linda McEvoy,33 and Indigenous Scholar-Elders like Lee Hester, Leroy Little Bear,
John Borrows and Lee Maracle. Lorraine Mayer released my chains and others named above
nudged, challenged, encouraged and moved me to deep reflection, while allowing me opportunities
to experience in their company what I was learning in their words about Indigenous ethics, politics,
epistemology and law.34 Gradually, I saw the artificial constructs we had created on Turtle Island
hide a normative reality we do not want to see. Indeed, it is almost impossible for us to see it.35
Working on collaborative pieces for Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights, Lorraine and I
coined the expression “inter-philosophy(ies) dialogue” to identify the kind of conversations we
had. We saw our dialogues resolving around what Dale Turner calls the standoff between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous understandings of Aboriginal rights, and others see as the
incommensurability of Indigenous and Western paradigms/philosophies.36 We have engaged in

inter-philosophy dialogues since 1997 and our anthology stands as proof of the power of these
dialogues for bridging standoffs and achieving consensus. We co-wrote many pieces for the
anthology. They show agreement on the many issues creating real world standoffs and
incommensurability arguments. One reviewer saw our lack of disagreement in our co-authored
pieces as proof that we were not actually engaged in inter-philosophy dialogue. If we argue for
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only one conclusion, how can we be arguing from two points of view?37 As we explain in “This is
not a Conclusion,” we dialogued about every line and paragraph in our co-authored pieces and
about the arguments of every contributor to the anthology. We also agreed with the content and
arguments in each other’s articles. The road to consensus was sometimes bumpy with twists, turns,
and backtracking. Because our dialogue aimed for understanding and expression of our shared
understanding, it was intense and could even become tense. Our friendship was undoubtedly the
glue that sustained the dialogue and ensured its success. Our success proves that someone from
the standpoint of Cree philosophy and someone from the standpoint of Western philosophy can
dialogue their way to consensus.
In dialoguing with Lorraine, I acquired knowledge, skills, and intellectual virtues that
enabled me to engage inter-philosophy dialogues with Indigenous scholars and Elders I meet at
the Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights conference in 2001 and with whom Lorraine and I worked
to create our anthology. At this point, it is important to say that, while my prisoner’s chains needed
to be released and I received a lot of Indigenous instruction during my journey to my present
understanding of normative reality on Turtle Island, the journey was mine.
I am a philosopher, trained to be critical and questioning rather than accepting of premises,
arguments, and theories. My training makes me disposed to assess critically the assertions of
experts. Unlike social scientists, I am trained to accord citations almost zero epistemic status.

While acknowledging the assistance of many Indigenous persons to arrive at this point in my
evolving understanding of the collective rights of Canada and Indigenous nations, like Best, I have
done the cognitive work to arrive at my position.
Indigenous colleagues have never told me how to think, what to think, or that my thinking
was wrongheaded (Lorraine looked this thought occasionally.). We engaged in critical dialogue.
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Sharing their understanding and answering my questions, they gave me new information, and
ultimately a new perspective. No Indigenous colleague told me that we are prisoners in the
Colonial-Perceptual-Reality-Cave. I decided that this metaphor captured our predicament when I
put together insights gained from Socrates + Lorraine + Sa’ke’j., all of whom abetted my
discovery. Socrates also gave me the responsibility he assigned to the released prisoner, namely,
to return to The Cave and help others escape. In this paper, I have returned to The Cave to release
Best and hopefully other chained prisoners.
For years after my prisoner’s chains were released, I could not understand why my nonIndigenous colleagues have apparently unshakable confidence in Canada’s legitimacy. Why do
politicians serving as Ministers overseeing the Indian Act, presumably working closely with
Indigenous people, not come to see Canada. In short, why do others not see what I see? Whenever
I presented my work at conferences, I had no difficulty responding to questions or challenges. If
anyone thought my argument was sound, I was usually told that the legitimacy of most European
nations, perhaps even most nation states, could be challenged by analogous arguments. This
response, which at first frustrated me, still frustrates me but now makes me smile. My argument
chain has survived another test. Telling me that my position implies there is a lot of unjust
sovereignty exercised on Earth came as no surprise.38 However, this response is epistemically
frustrating. It dismisses my arguments; it does not address their soundness. Given the huge justice

problems I am exposing which Canada and Canadians have moral obligations (and legal
obligations) to address, dismissing my arguments is as problematic morally and politically as it is
epistemically. Is it really in our best interests to turn away from the truth and build our solutions
to Canada’s most serious justice problems on shadows? Can non-Indigenous Canadians live with
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Canada, adding centuries more of violating Indigenous human (individual and collective) rights
to the centuries when we have already done so? Do we not care?

Another Treaty Relationship: Why We Should Care

All justice recommendations regarding Canada’s relationship with Indigenous Peoples
should be based on accurate historical data. Best is to be commended for researching the history
of the treaty relationship. His expert, Alexander Morris, was born in 1826. Morris was not
reporting on the relationship between European and Indigenous nations at first contact.39 Part of
John A. MacDonald’s negotiating team for the numbered treaties, Morris negotiated postconfederation treaties several centuries after European nations, including Britain, negotiated Peace
and Friendship and Covenant Chain treaties. To learn why the nation-to-nation treaty relationship
was not always a fiction, and to learn the content of the Crown’s negotiations with Indigenous
nations when it was settling British citizens on Turtle Island, I recommend Best read Bruce
Morito’s An Ethic of Mutual Respect: The Covenant Chain and Aboriginal-Crown Relations.
Morito, a non-Indigenous philosopher, provides insight into the historical record of the
Covenant Chain treaties and a careful analysis of the moral framework which provided the basis
for the early treaty relationship.40 Morito spent many years studying the archival records kept by

Europeans who negotiated, observed, or recorded treaty negotiations beginning in 1682.41 To
understand how Canada and Indigenous Nations arrived at today’s fictional treaty relationship,
Best should begin at the beginning. Morito’s focus is Covenant Chain treaties, which followed
Peace and Friendship treaties on the East Coast of Turtle Island. Nevertheless, he shows how
Covenant Chain treaties evolved out of earlier nation-to-nation treaty processes. He also shows
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how the Covenant Chain treaty relationship evolved into a new nation-to-nation relationship by
the time Alexander Morris was negotiating numbered treaties for MacDonald. Morris documents
a treaty process Canada regarded as a fiction. As Morito explains, Indigenous nations understood
Canada’s perception, and resisted it. 42 In a nation-to-nation treaty relationship, Canada was
destined to become illegitimate, as fictional as the fictional treaty relationship it was establishing.
As Morito explains, the Crowns entered the Covenant Chain Treaty relationship knowing
that this relationship
...was entered into, not by noble or ignoble Savages, but by people who well understood
the process of negotiation and litigation. The Covenant Chain forum was one in which
discourse was driven by the need for justification; Aboriginal people were not constantly
duped by Crown officials; assuaged by gifts (often described as trinkets in the popular
historiography), or cheated because they did not know any better” (Morito, 24).

Morito does not mince words when describing British and Canadian intentions/ aspirations in
entering treaties:
(T)he Crown, from the beginning and in both of its renditions (British and Canadian), has
striven to make First Nations dependents, children, and subjects. Even though military and
political realities militated against this political aspiration, there is continuity in the
Crown’s aspiration. Once it could, the Crown attempted to transform treaties from peace
and friendship into surrenders” (Morito, 195).

Indians discovered British intentions and understood Canada’s intentions. Leroy Little
Bear told me about this. He said negotiators for the Crown always had a Tickle Trunk of costumes

at treaty negotiations.43 They put on whatever costume they perceived would get them what they
wanted. Normative beliefs in liberal theory(ies), though not its justice principles, provided
materials for the government’s costumes and accessories that covered up/justified/whitewashed its
actions for its Eurocentric audience. The Crown (Canada) needed then, like Canada needs now,
its actions, treaty promises and treaty implementation to be perceived as just.44 The trunk was full
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of costumes because Indigenous people kept exposing the injustice hidden by the costume, thereby
necessitating making new one.
If the argument of my paper to date has shaken Best’s confidence in his experts, he will be
prepared at this point to rethink his nation-to-nation assessment of the treaty relationship. To help
him do this, I will briefly explain Morito’s account of how the earlier treaty relationship devolved
into a nation-to-nation relationship. To the extent that the Crown and Canada justified beliefs
about the inferiority of Indigenous persons and nations and treatment of Indigenous people and
Peoples, justifications were largely based in political theories of 16th and 17th century British
philosophers.45 Liberal theory’s notions of human rights, including the right to sovereignty and
private property were created by Hobbes and Locke and refined by Hume and John Stuart Mill.
The theories they created--and it is important to note they have different conflicting political
theories—gave British politicians a collection of normative beliefs to justify violating the human
and sovereignty rights of Indigenous Peoples anywhere on Earth.
These great white men in the canon of Western philosophy birthed political liberalism, and
simultaneously dug the Colonial-Perceptual-Reality-Cave. In The Cave, non-Indigenous
politicians, philosophers, political scientists, lawyers, and Canadians generally, used the
normative frameworks they created. Their theories, rooted in a humanity-hierarchy, were founded
on false beliefs and misguided valuing and disrespect for non-white humans, women, and non-

human beings, and baseless empirical claims about Indians in North America. For the purposes
of this paper, I only examine their assertion that Indians in North America lived in a State of
Nature, not civil society.
As Morito explains, these philosophers populated The Cave wall with images of
Indigenous Peoples living outside of civil society. These are the shadows Best and his experts use
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to solve ‘the Aboriginal problem’. Thinking with other prisoners about Indigenous Peoples living
in a non-existent State of Nature, the artificial construct Hobbes and Locke created based upon
FREISD, the construction of Best’s argument chain is unsurprising. Best’s great confidence that
his conclusions are true also no longer surprises.46 Having grasped that all nations do not have to
look the same, meaning that Indian nations can look different from European nations and still
qualify as nations, Best will be heading out of The Cave. As Morito establishes from our historical
records, there was a time when non-Indigenous negotiators behaved as though they perceived
Indian nations as nations. I refer explicitly to the behavior of non-Indigenous treaty negotiators,
because the Crown’s actual perception of Indigenous nations appears to be more in keeping with
Best’s notion of nation than his notion of nation. In the Appendix, I provide the 1763 reference to
Canada in the Treaty of Paris. Although early treaties only exist because negotiators treated with
Indigenous Peoples as though they were nations, between themselves, it is clear the Crowns of
France and Britain thought that they could transfer among themselves the sovereignty in the
wording of the citizens of nations
Crown negotiators for Peace and Friendship and Covenant Chain treaties knew that they
were negotiating with political leaders experienced in treating on behalf of Indian nations which
had the political, legal, economic, cultural, and spiritual structures a nation has.

Are Equal Human Rights The Best Way?

“Although the White Paper was eventually rescinded as official policy, White Paper
liberalism continues to capture many of the attitudes Canadians have about Aboriginal peoples in
Canadian society” (Turner, 14). Best’s impassioned plea for equal individual human rights for all

30

CJPP, Volume 7, 2021

Seeing Differences Differently: Peter Best and Morally Relevant Differences

Sandra Tomsons

Canadians, that is, Indigenous assimilation, indicates that Turner’s assessment of Canadian society
in 2006 applies equally well in 2021. Best draws many conclusions from his comparisons of the
different ways Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians live. I respond to two: 1) the terrible
living conditions in some Northern Ontario Indigenous communities and Indians being
disproportionately represented in Canada’s justice system are the result of the special rights of
Indigenous people and 2) the only rational choice for Indigenous persons is to opt for equality with
non-Indigenous Canadians in Canada.
Like Canada’s past political and intellectual elites, and Pierre Trudeau and Jean Chrétien’s
White Paper, Best argues that Indians would be better off if they were not Indians. Urging Indians
to choose quality of life, that is, the Canadian way of life, he only sees good consequences for
those making this choice. In The Cave, looking at the shadows on the wall, Best can only see that
Indians have everything to gain and nothing to lose by giving up their rights as citizens of Indian
nations. Since he can only see Indigenous nations where Indigenous people see Indigenous
nations, it is impossible for him to realize the irrationality of the choice he is offering Indigenous
people. They deny who they are when they accept Best’s offer.
In The Cave, Best can only see becoming Canadians as the rational choice for Indigenous
people. An example will illustrate that this choice is only rational if one is in The Cave. Gunars
has just driven Sandra, Lorraine, and Peter through some First Nation communities and some

adjacent non-Indigenous communities in northern Ontario. He asks his passengers: “Where would
you choose to live?” Obviously, Peter chooses a non-Indigenous community. Cries from a Metis
Heart explains why Lorraine, a Métis, accepting her Cree and French heritage, and choosing Cree
philosophy and its way-of-being-in-the-world in theory, in theory she could choose any of the
communities. However, as she explains in Cries, an Indian community offers her love and support;
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living in a non-Indian community can mean confronting racism every time she leaves her home.
However, since the Anishinaabe communities in northern Ontario through which they are driving
are reserved for Anishinaabe status Indians, not Métis, legally she cannot choose to live in these
communities. Sandra, after three decades of IPD (inter-philosophy/ies dialogue) with Lorraine, is
very attracted to the Indigenous community because of Indigenous all-my-relations ethics.
However, she knows the colonial relationship, the Indian Act, and overcrowded First Nations’
communities mean that she, like Lorraine, does not really have the choice Gunars offers. Because
of Canada’s unjust relationship with Indigenous Nations, Sandra, like Lorraine, cannot become a
permanent resident of an Indigenous community.
Answering Gunars’ question depends in part on one’s perceptual reality, that is, beliefs,
values, and attitudes as well as on constraints Canada has placed on Indigenous communities.
When Best looks at an Indigenous community, he sees terrible material conditions and economic
prospects resulting from Indigenous refusal to assimilate. When Sandra looks at the same
Indigenous community, she sees the consequences of our FREISD-based violation of Indigenous
Peoples’ individual and collective rights. She sees a better way to live in an all-our-relations
Indigenous ethics. Given their different perceptual realities, Best and Sandra’s preferences are
different though both are rational.

Conclusion

I stated at the beginning of my paper that I aimed to prove Best’s argument-chain proving
Indigenous nations are nations is unsound. The naturalistic fallacy made it easy for me to deliver
on this objective. Many decades of research establishing Canada’s illegitimacy meant it was not
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difficult to show that the starting point of Best’s argument, i.e., “Canada is a nation,” is false.
While I am confident that non-Indigenous Canadians are socialized into the Colonial-PerceptualReality-Cave, since being epistemic prisoners provides huge obstacles to truth discovery, I am less
confident that I have convinced Best and other Indigenous scholars that The Cave exists. Our
being in The Cave explains ongoing colonialism as well as our repeated failure to propose a
solution that Indigenous Peoples perceive as just.
The vast majority of my instructors about The Cave were Indigenous, so I do not know if
a non-Indigenous scholar can assist other non-Indigenous scholars to discover The Cave and
colonial-perceptual-reality. If the arguments in my paper give Best some doubt about Canada’s
legitimacy, I encourage him to spend time reading Indigenous authors, especially their scholarly
works, autobiographies, biographies, fiction, poetry and plays. Time in the company of all the
Indigenous scholars I mention above would provide him with many opportunities to discover The
Cave and how it impedes and distorts our thinking about Indigenous Peoples and their nations. I
especially encourage Best to read John Borrows recent book, Law’s Indigenous Ethics. Borrows
is a legal scholar who explicitly discusses the essential components of Best’s argument in his
chapter on the Grandmother’s last teaching gift, Respect. Borrows respectfully examines the
argument in Best’s book and a letter Best wrote to the Sudbury Star in July 2013.
Borrows’ response invites Best to engage in the IPD I have shown permits one to escape

from The Cave. Examining the Grandmother’s teaching about respect, Borrows demonstrates
what this teaching requires when one engages with someone who perceives the world differently
and may not be respectful of one’s different perceptual reality. When Best compares my
engagement with him in this paper with how Borrows analyses and assesses his position, he will
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rightly conclude that “Tomsons is a Western philosopher who neither understands nor exemplifies
the Indigenous notion of respect and caring for others it requires of practitioners.”
In the fall of 2018, when I decided to write a paper on There is no Difference to present at
the Conference of the Canadian Society for the Study of Practical Ethics (CSSPE) as part of the
2019 Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences, I had objectives 1 and 2 stated at the
beginning of this paper. I wanted to deconstruct the argument-chain of someone who is as
passionate as I am about justice, but, who, in 2018, was arguing for a solution to the Aboriginal
justice problem which was discredited and discarded by politicians and scholars decades ago.
Frustrated that the White Paper’s understanding of Indigenous persons and Peoples rights in
Canada could still be promoted as the just solution, I was interested in how a lawyer in northern
Ontario, every bit as concerned about the suffering in First Nations communities as I am, would
justify his position in his very fat book.47 As I worked on the paper, I discovered in the values and
passion Best and I shared the basis for some confidence that we could have an inter-philosophy
dialogue. Confident that Best’s position originated in The Cave, however, meant that I would have
to explain why we saw First Nations and Canada so differently. How could I respectfully tell him
that he was a prisoner in The Cave? Obviously, by telling him I had been there and was glad that
I had made an exit. I was not surprised that Best’s argument-chain rested on theories of political
scientists whose theories I refuted decades ago. In my one-sided dialogue with Best, I tried to

show him that they lead him away from the truth about Canada and encouraged him to peer at
shadows on The Cave wall because they too were chained prisoners. Working on the third
objective of the paper has provided another opportunity to discuss with my friends at the CSSPE
how colonial-perceptual-reality is an obstacle to a just solution to Canada’s justice problem, that
is, to its legitimacy.
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Best’s commitment to rational persuasion, equality, and improving Indians’ lives lead me
to think that if we had the opportunity for IPD, and were in the company of Indigenous scholars,
we could agree on the injustice of past/present relationships, see Canada’s legitimacy problem,
and agree on what justice would look like on Turtle Island.
Since there are important gaps in Canada’s origin story in the normative landscape of
Best’s argument-chain, I was confident that providing some missing pieces would cancel the
influence of FREISD in his thinking about Indigenous nations. If he could be brought to see the
normative and empirical reality of First Nations, he would see that his equality-assimilation
proposal is unjust and join me in promoting a justice proposal that seeks justice for Indigenous
Peoples.
We could then urge Canada to respect the sovereignty rights of First Nations and
implement the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. When Best’s understanding
of the normative reality on Turtle Island matches normative facts, he will realize that Indigenous
legal traditions and ethics, not Canada’s law and ethics, are the appropriate starting points for
making the present nation-to-nation treaty relationship a nation-to-nation relationship. Present and
future generations of non-Indigenous illegal immigrants negotiating from their nation position,
can transform Canada into Canada. While creating a legitimate nation, we can become Indigenous
law-abiding citizens on Turtle Island.
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Endnotes
1

I thank participants in Zoom gatherings of the CSSPE, CPA and CS:IVR for helping me think more deeply about
various components of my argument chain in this paper. Special thanks to Bruce Morito, Douglas Rabb, Kira Tomsons
and second reviewers for challenging questions and invaluable revision recommendations.
2
Best uses Indian and non-Indian throughout his book. For the most part, I use Indigenous and European. I don’t use
Indian because Indigenous people have good reasons for regarding Indian Act naming as disrespectful.
3
I use Canada and Canadian throughout. I show that Canada fails the legitimacy test and I am unwilling in my
writing to pretend it does and misrepresent its normative status.
4
Peter Best, There is no Difference: An Argument for the Abolition of the Indian Reserve System and Special RaceBased Laws and Entitlements for Canada’s Indians, 13.
5
Sa’ke’j Youngblood Henderson helped me see that this dichotomy infuses Eurocentric perceiving and thinking and
he schooled me in how to discern it in non-Indigenous theorizing about Indigenous Peoples and their rights.
6
Best is unclear about whether he sees human rights as positive and negative. A positive interpretation requires
Canada to put in place the conditions that would allow Indigenous people to exercise and enjoy their rights. Since
Canada’s public schools, universal health care and social services are premised on this interpretation, and since Best
laments that Indians do not have these goods, I assume agreement on the conclusion, “Equal human rights for Indians
means that Canada has an obligation to equalize Indigenous and non-Indigenous basic need satisfaction.”
Best’s insistence on Indigenous persons’ equal human rights has important material consequences for their wellbeing. For example, it imposes costly obligations on Canada when it goes to Court, as it often does, to avoid equal
medical coverage, access to education, and child welfare services. Best’s vivid descriptions of many First Nations
provide evidence of Canada’s ongoing violations of Indigenous persons’ basic human rights. Past and present
omissions have violated their basic rights to healthy air, water and soil, housing, education, and health care. Canada’s
negligence is doubly unjust since these expenditures are required by a difference between Indigenous and nonIndigenous persons. Best does not discuss Canada’s constitutional fiduciary obligations to Indians. Canada acquired
this legal responsibility when, in 1867, Britain transferred its illegitimate sovereignty to the new illegitimate Dominion
of Canada.
7
In fairness to Chief Justice Marshall, Best cannot build his case against Indian nations on Marshall’s judgment.
Marshall misleadingly uses the expression dependent nation. However, his description of Indian nations and his
judgments favouring the Cherokee both support seeing the Cherokee (Indian nations) as a real nation having land and
sovereignty rights.
8
Tom Flanagan, 2008; Francis Widdowson, 2008; Chief Justice John Marshall, 1831 & 1832; Peter Heather, 2010.
9
Best notes that Flanagan’s requirements for civilization include many of Heather’s features. Civilization is a term
“…commonly used and understood by historians, of which the political state is one of the highest expressions” (Best,
226-27). Best’s discussion of Heather is based on Heather’s book, Empires and Barbarians (2010). Heather’s theories
are deservedly controversial. Allowing for the possibility that his knowledge of antiquity and the Middle Ages in
Europe is as extensive as that of Indigenous Knowledge Keepers on Turtle Island of their history during these times,
nonetheless, qua historian, Heather’s contribution is purely descriptive and explanatory. History’s methodologies do
not have the tools for assessing nations. Heather’s normative assessments of events or nations are based on his values.
However, when he is assessing, he is not being a social scientist. He is either doing philosophy or expressing an
opinion. Since he does not use philosophy’s methodologies, I conclude that he is expressing an opinion which adds
no epistemic value to Best’s argument.
10
Factually, Indigenous Peoples at first contact, and thereafter, satisfy many features on Heather’s list for superior
nations: large scale regionally-based political structure, a defined border, political consolidation, architecture, private
property, heritable leadership, a unifying ideology, a structured religion, wealth accumulation, material surpluses, an
increase in the amount of movable wealth, a core of towns and villages, agriculture production, international trade,
trade networks, transportation and communication networks, and grave sites. I removed some normative content from
Heather’s descriptors, which appear worded so as by definition/stipulation to allow only for Eurocentric peoples to be
classified as political states or civilized.
Ironically, Canada, a superior political state, according to Best, does not satisfy the defendable border requirement.
It has not existed long enough to know whether European criteria for permanent buildings are satisfied.
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Also, for transportation, the water ecosystems Indigenous Peoples used are more permanent than anything Canada
has built.
11 It is relevant in assessing Best’s argument-chain to establish Canada’s superior nationhood that Heather ascribes
unjust practices to so-called “superior” nations. Examples include predatory expansion, patronage, minimum internal
movement, an unfree class to provide services, and exploiting outsiders. Best’s entire argument chain is premised on
valuing justice. Is this consistent with judging an unjust state to be a superior nation? Is a state which respects all
humans equally and protects every person’s rights not superior to an unjust state which denies in word and violates in
deed the human rights of women and Indigenous persons? Are older buildings, cemeteries with monuments, and higher
GPD more important criteria for determining the superiority of a nation than justice?
12
Spencer coined the expression the survival of the fittest.
13 By the end of World War II, biologists and sociologists agreed that Darwin’s descriptive scientific theory does not
support Social Darwinists’ normative inferior-superior judgements. It cannot be inferred from the fittest surviving that
the fittest is best and those not surviving are less good or bad. Since it is not based merely on empirical data, Social
Darwinism is generally regarded as pseudoscience.
14 The inferior-superior dichotomy is the normative core of any Social Darwinist theory. John A. MacDonald
presumed Social Darwinism as Prime Minister in Canada’s first government when engaging in negotiations with and
decision-making about Indigenous Peoples. Social Darwinism ‘justified’ the Indian Act, which was created to define
“Indian”, institutionalize the reserve system and Indigenous band council self-governance, and to ensure nonIndigenous domination of every aspect of Indigenous individual and collective life.
15 Best and his experts believe that Canada is a superior nation in every aspect of being a nation. Their normative
judgments are conclusions of an argument-chain employing their values and value-hierarchy. Unfortunately for their
argument, they have not even attempted to justify either. Presenting their theories and justice proposals in a Western
society, they may believe that justification is unnecessary. Their values and value hierarchy are shared with many of
their readers.
If it is reasonable to presume no one will dispute them, justifying premises in an argument is a waste of time and
words. However, Best (and his experts) can reasonably predict that his values and value hierarchy will be contested.
He explicitly directs his arguments and proposals to Indigenous persons, whom he would have good reasons to believe
would not share his values and value hierarchy.
I also contest the values underlying the inferior-superior nation judgments. For decades, I have argued in my
environmental ethics classes, papers, and presentations that an Indigenous all-my-relations-ethics, and Indigenous law
and economies consistent with it, are superior to the West’s anthropocentric ethics and Western societies’ law and
economies consistent with it.
16 In brief, after refuting unwarranted normative presumptions such as Heather’s descriptions of European and
Indigenous nations, which presume to prove that the former (hence Canada) are superior nations, I would argue that,
in fact, Indigenous nations are superior. For example, if Indigenous nations design economic and health care systems
where good relationships are at the top of their value hierarchy, whereas European style nations put capitalism’s notion
of private property at the top of their value-hierarchy, Indian nations are superior because they are more just.
Note, my inferior-superior judgments are qualified. By itself, “Indigenous nations are superior,” is empty of content.
Something is superior to something else in a particular respect, that is, some value makes a nation superior or inferior.
17
It is true that not all social scientists moved out from under the umbrella. Some have opted to keep a foot in both
methodologies. For example, in the context of theorizing about Aboriginal rights, James Tully, Peter Russell, J.
Anthony Long (Political Science), Michael Asch (Anthropology), and Menno Bolt (Sociology) know that they are
engaging in normative reasoning and explicitly use normative premises when arguing for normative conclusions.
18
Best isn’t quoting the OED’s definition of nation, which is “a country considered as a group of people with the
same language, culture, and history, who live in a particular area under one government, an independent nation, the
African nations.” However, many sources attribute this definition to the OED; see for example, Joep Leerssen’s
National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History (16.) I assume that Best finds the definition he is using in one of
these sources.
19
Best does not use necessary and sufficient condition language; however, he treats lists provided by Heather and
Flanagan as if this is what they are.
20
OED’s definition of “civilization” illustrates problems inherent in claiming that one only uses the word
descriptively. “Civilization 1. state of human society that is very developed and organized; the technology of modern
civilization (The settlers saw themselves as bringing progress and civilization to the wilderness.); 2. a society, its
culture, and its way of life during a particular period of time or in a particular part of the world (The civilizations of
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ancient Greece and Rome had diseases that are common in Western civilization.); 3. All the people in the world and
the societies they live in, considered as a whole (Environmental damage threatens the whole of civilization.); 4. a
place that offers you the comfortable way of life of a modern society (It's good to be back in civilization after two
weeks in a tent!).”
It does not require a deep analysis to show that English speakers use civilization in inconsistent ways and only
definitions 2 & 3 are unambiguously descriptive. According to definitions 1 & 4, the word applies only to modern
societies. This would surprise those using it according to definition 2, which explicitly encompasses ancient Greece
and Rome. Definitions 1 & 4 are very exclusive in a manner inconsistent with definition 3’s inclusivity. 1 & 4 both
restrict the application of “civilization”. Definition 1 provides the criteria to be satisfied which definition 4 presumes,
that is, developed, organized, having modern technology.
Some words have an inescapably normative definition. In these cases, the words, for example, ‘right,’ ‘good,’
‘beautiful,’ ‘false,’ are explicitly normative. However, as the OED demonstrates, we use some words in descriptive
and normative ways, and “civilization” is this type of word. When the definition of civilization is descriptive, it
applies to any society/nation. If the definition is normative, it informs about the values in common usage by English
speakers for sorting societies into civilized and uncivilized. However, saying what we do does not justify our practice.
The OED, like Best and his experts, does not prove that the values we use are the values we should use. In conclusion,
being consistent with the OED definition of “civilization” cannot justify Flanagan or Best claiming the values
presumed by their “Canada is superior to First Nations” judgment are the appropriate values for assessing nations as
superior. Best faces the same problem with his claim that Canada is the only nation in the nation-to-nation treaty
relationship.
21

I do not dispute understanding normative judgments as descriptive if one means that they are factual, applying to
the world and not based wholly on empirical data. When I call a law, policy, or action “unjust”, my normative
judgments describe real things in the real world, and my justice judgments are either true or false. However, whereas
empirical descriptive statements are based on reasoned perceptions, normative descriptive judgments include values
and justifying these judgments adds a layer of value-based reasoning to empirical data.
22
Best italicises nation to differentiate an inferior/unreal nation from a superior/real nation, Canada. He claims the
Anishnabek nation is “a political alliance and lobby group of Robinson-Huron treaty bands” (Best, 218).
23
I drop Best’s italics since using them cannot be justified.
24
In My Conversations with Canadians, Sto: Loh Elder Lee Maracle, who was the Traditional Teacher for First
Nation’s House, has written a conversational book for us. In the beginning, she points out that Canadians love causes
“…but they love the causes that are far away--out of their backyard, so to speak. Oh, wait: they don’t actually have a
legitimate backyard. They are here at our goodwill and by our host laws and by way of honouring our treaties--should
that happen. Most Canadians don’t see it that way, however. Nothing that happens to Indigenous people, no matter
how unlawful, is of much consequence to many of the people occupying Indigenous territories.” (8). Lee is one of
my Indigenous instructors per The Cave. She gifted me with wise words and riddles to solve. Lee died this month,
and only this morning, November 25, 2021, did I read the first chapter of her book and discover our perceptual reality
of Canada is so much the same. I urge anyone who has read this footnote to read the conversational book she has
written for us.
25
I was on the Canadian Philosophical Association’s organizing committee for this conference, along with David
Kahane, Dale Turner, and Lorraine Mayer. A generous grant from the SSHRC meant that all presenters were invited.
Indigenous and non-Indigenous recognized experts on Aboriginal rights were invited to present at this multidisciplinary conference. Indigenous presenters included an Elders Panel consisting of Leroy Little Bear and
Tobasonakwut Kinew, among others. Scholars included Taiaiake Alfred, John Borrows, Gordon Christie, Sa’ke’j
Youngblood Henderson, Lee Hester, Lorraine Mayer, Brian Rice; Dale Turner, and Mary Young.
26
Turner’s third reason for claiming that liberal theories are not peace pipes: “They do not question the legitimacy of
the Canadian state’s unilateral claim of sovereignty over Aboriginal lands and peoples” (7).
27
My conclusion contradicts recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. However, because
Dale’s analysis of the Commission’s work and recommendations in This is Not a Peace Pipe also shows that they do
not satisfy his third criterion, I am not as concerned as I would be otherwise. He worked for the Commission and
argues that RCAP’s recommendations do not understand the reality of Indigenous nations and sovereignty.
28

In Citizens Plus, Allan Cairns challenges The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples Report (RCAP) for
recommendating a parallel nation-to-nation relationship. Cairns sees such a relationship as problematic for many
reasons, including the political reality that Aboriginal nations are within Canada. “The goal is for the Aboriginal nation
to be a functioning partner in a contemporary state that is parliamentary, federal, monarchical, and endowed with a
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. his makes nation-to-nation a somewhat misleading description, for the Canadian
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nation encompasses the Aboriginal nation with which it is negotiating” (143). In an earlier argument to show why
self-government is only half an answer to the Aboriginal problem, Cairns claims: “Self-government is a response to
the failure of past policies... In large part, therefore, self-government was seized on because the obvious rival was an
indefensible status quo, relentlessly attacked by Aboriginal nationalists who believed that Aboriginal peoples could
do a better job of governing themselves.”
Cairns’ claim that Indian nations are within Canada is problematic. An illegitimate nation has drawn lines on the
map of the world, putting Aboriginal nations within its borders. Aboriginal nations draw their own borders on maps
of Turtle Island predating European declarations of sovereignty and treaty negotiations. Is Canada within Aboriginal
nations or Aboriginal nations within Canada? History supports the former. It is also problematic to describe selfgovernment as an Aboriginal response to Canada’s failures. Aboriginal nationalists demand sovereignty, not selfgovernment regulated by Canada. They are claiming an entitlement they have had since time immemorial, so it is not
a response to Canada’s failure to govern them. It is a response to Canada’s presumption to govern them. They
correctly claim that Canada has no entitlement to govern them period.
29

In This is Not a Peace Pipe, Dale Turner shows that Kymlicka does not see Canada’s legitimacy problem in his
account of the relationship between European Crown’s and Aboriginal Peoples. After acknowledging Indigenous
nations were unjustly incorporated into Canada, Kymlicka should see Canada’s legitimacy problem. If Canada exists
by unjustly incorporating Indigenous nations, liberal theory cannot legitimize Canada.
If we unjustly incorporated Indigenous nations, Indigenous Peoples morally and legally still possess collective
rights to sovereignty. This means that Canada does not possess rights to their lands and is not a legitimate sovereign
on Turtle Island. After many years of presenting on Canada’s legitimacy problem, no one has ever provided me with
a justice principle in liberal theory that gives Britain or Canada the right to unilaterally incorporate Indigenous
Peoples, let alone incorporate them unjustly.
Canada’s legitimacy problem creates serious obstacles for Kymlicka’s theory of Aboriginal rights. Unless Canada
is a legitimate nation, his notion of minority nations within a nation makes no sense. Since Canada is not legitimate,
Kymlicka and other political philosophers have the problem of finding in liberal theory a way for Canada to become
a nation while recognizing that liberal theory accords Indigenous nations legitimate nation status. I argue that liberal
theory’s solution is the one which Indigenous Peoples have been offering/demanding all along.
30

The non-Indigenous epistemic predicament since Confederation may be less serious for future generations than for
me and for Best. My grandchildren Quinn and Simon were born in 2009, and Faye and Ezra in 2013. In 2021, they
know more about the relationship between Indigenous Peoples and the Europeans than I knew when I graduated with
a Ph.D. in philosophy. They perceive past and present actions and omissions of our governments as “unfair” (Quinn’s
word). While dwelling in The Cave, since they have been socialized to perceive Canada as a legitimate, and even a
great, nation, they nevertheless understand that Canada is not respecting Indigenous Peoples and ignores most of its
obligations to them. Quinn understands what I mean when I call Canada a “pretend” nation. He does not understand
most of the implications, however.
31
It would be hard to exaggerate how important my collaboration with Sa’ke’j has been in discovering The Cave. He
gave me the inferior-superior dichotomy, which, in my thinking, became the notion of FREISD. When Sa’ke’j pointed
out our reliance on this dichotomy in all legal and political discourse about Aboriginal rights, I began to see it
everywhere in non-Indigenous books and articles I was reading, most recently in Peter Best’s book.
32

After the announcement of the Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights came out in 2001, Paul generously gave of his
time to participate in an e-mail dialogue about Aboriginal rights and he came to the conference with several of his
friends.
33

Janice and Linda gifted me their friendship. In our relationships, I learned about being a virtuous Indigenous
person.
Janice was my executive assistant when organizing the Aboriginal rights conference, and faithful friend thereafter.
Janice’s guidance and unwavering good spirits got me through the trials and tribulations a non-Indigenous woman
could be expected to have when she is the local organizer of such an important conference. Janice taught me the
wisdom of laughter and where to buy the supplies for, and how to wrap, bundles of tobacco.
Over time, Elder McEvoy became for me the Platonic Form for Elder. In her presence, I felt that I encountered
Plato’s formula for justice in the individual and the state: courage + moderation + wisdom = justice. She let me visit
with her when students were not wanting her time; she talked to my Intro students about her experience in Residential
School. She invited me to join her drum group and to walk beside her at a Pow Wow to celebrate Aboriginal students’
graduation.

39

CJPP, Volume 7, 2021

Seeing Differences Differently: Peter Best and Morally Relevant Differences

Sandra Tomsons

Like Janice, Elder Linda taught by word and deed. I will be forever grateful for every moment I spent in their
company.
34

Lorraine makes the distinction between Community and Scholarly Elders in Mayer, 2013.1.

35

I have no means to discover whether Lorraine or Dennis McPherson are recognized Elders in their communities.
Despite an epistemic certainty that does not always seem consistent with Indigenous epistemic humility, Lorraine’s
deep understanding of Cree philosophy, her passion for justice and her endless good works have made her my personal
Scholarly Elder since we met in 1997. It has taken me longer to get to know Dennis. Having learned from Lorraine
and Tobasonakwut respectively that epistemic humility and being sweet are not necessary characteristics of Scholar
Elders, but understanding your People’s philosophy and speaking truth to power are, I have concluded that Dennis
qualifies as a Scholarly Elder.
36
When I interviewed Scholarly Elder Leroy Little Bear for his contribution to Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights, he
explained why he prefers paradigm to philosophy (Little Bear, 2013).
37
In his review Professor Larivière claims “…the most serious fault with Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights is its
almost complete failure to instantiate a necessary critical dialogue. Although it promises the communication and
exchange of views between persons of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ancestry (constructing these persons as
representatives of and partly constituted by the intellectual context of that ancestry), it does not deliver. The book, in
sum, is but half of a conversation. This lopsidedness is no more clearly shown than in the case of the ‘dialogues’
between Tomsons and Mayer. What occurs is not a dialogue between distinct, contrasting or competing viewpoints,
but rather the two-voiced articulation of a single viewpoint” (233-34). What Larivière deems the most serious fault of
our anthology, Lorraine and I deem its greatest virtue. Our dialogues seriously challenge those who claim that there
is an incommensurability of Western and Indigenous philosophy regarding Aboriginal rights. While there are
incommensurabilities between Western and Indigenous philosophy(ies), there is agreement between liberal theory’s
understanding of the right of Indigenous Peoples on Turtle Island and Indigenous Peoples’ understanding thereof. The
problem is to get non-Indigenous people in The Cave to realize this.
38

Since this question could be intended to challenge the practicality of my conclusions, I began including in my
presentations and papers a section on why admitting Canada has an illegitimacy problem is not something we should
be fearful of doing. Knowing what the justice problem is means we can now begin to solve it. I have constructed
argument chains of various lengths to show that Indigenous politicians are very unlikely to do unto us as we did unto
them. Non-Indigenous listeners have never responded to my argument to show that admitting Canada illegitimacy
would have positive, not dire, consequences for Canadians.
39

Best claims that all his treaty references are from Alexander Ross’ seminal book, The Treaties of Canada With the
Indians. It took me several days, but I am confident that Alexander Ross has not authored a book by this title.
However, Alexander Morris has. This seems to be Best’s source for his discussion of treaty making after
confederation.
40

For a century, until the late 1700s, the Crown developed a treaty system with the Iroquois and other Indian Nations,
known as The Covenant Chain.
41

Morito focuses on William Johnson, an agent of the British Crown, and other British agents. He also examines van
Curler explaining how his relationship with the Mohawk was crucial to Dutch dealings with the Mohawk nation which
“...established the peace and friendship treaty of 1643” (Morito, 109). Van Curler’s personal relationships with
Aboriginal people illustrate an ethics of mutual respect at the micro-level. Having good relationships with Aboriginal
people personally, he successfully established and renewed Crown-Aboriginal nations relationships. As Morito
explains, “Whereas other traders made use of alcohol to manipulate Aboriginal hunters, van Curler used an approach
designed to produce peace and friendship by constantly renewing the relationship, thus enabling the initial relationship
to evolve from a rope into an iron chain” (Morito, 110). It is not surprising that what worked to produce peace and
friendship between traders works to produce peace and friendship between nations.
Economic and political relationships do not require the deep affection that cements personal relationships; however,
they do require mutual respect. Affection may accelerate the evolution from rope to iron. Affection likely even implies
mutual trust supporting the mutual respect which binds together an economic or political relationship. In his careful
analysis, Morito shows how the rope and chain disintegrated when the Crown stopped respecting Indian Nations. The
Crown’s exercise of brute power created the colonial nation-to-nation treaty relationship Canada has with First
Nations in 2021.
42

In Morito’s book, Best will not learn about the first treaty relationships on Turtle Island. In the Canada part of
Turtle Island, treaty relationship began with Peace and Friendship treaties with the Mi’kmaq nation in L’nu (Nova
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Scotia on world maps.). For a short, informative discussion of this ongoing treaty process, I recommend Jaime
Battiste’s “Finding Forgiveness, Building Trust.”
43

Leroy Little Bear explained his tickle trunk metaphor when I interviewed him for his contribution to the Aboriginal
rights anthology (Little Bear, 2013). When negotiating treaties with First Nations, the Crown always brought its tickle
trunk. Like Mr. Dress-up on CBC’s long-running popular children’s TV programme, the Crown had many costumes
in the trunk. It carefully selected the costume guaranteed to get it what it wanted.
44

This desire on the part of Canada to be perceived as just is no less strong today. However, with Indigenous politicians
and scholars from sea-to-sea-to-sea on Turtle Island saying, “It’s all about the land, you have always tried to steal our
land,” Canada is running short of costumes and accessories. In my research, I have not found a policy proposed or
made law by Canada pertaining to Indigenous Peoples which at birth or shortly thereafter is not a new costume for
colonialism--a new way to steal land from Indigenous Peoples and violate their rights (inherent and treaty). Our
wickedness would make me believe in Christianity’s doctrine of original sin, if I did not have so many Indigenous
friends.
45
European philosophers gifted us with liberal theory and refined its notions of individual and collective rights:
Britain: Hobbes and Locke, 17th century; Hume, 18th century, and John Stuart Mill, 19th century; France:
Rousseau, 18th century; Germany: Kant, 18th century.
46
As Bruce Morito explains “…European colonizers enjoyed an increasing social licence that allowed the ideas of
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau (and later Darwin) the freedom to grow and influence. Together, these developments
helped produce the historiographic bias that Aboriginal people were not fully developed and, therefore, could not be
considered a civilized people with a clear conception of law. Any remnants of Aboriginal systems of law could be
devalued and denigrated with impunity because Aboriginal military and economic power had dissolved. These
developments also helped support the view that whatever Aboriginal systems had been in place could do nothing but
fall victim to the irresistible revolutionary forces sweeping Europe and the rest of the world” (Morito, 66).
47
I share with Best the penchant for writing fat books and fat articles.

APPENDIX
Canada in the Treaty of Paris (1763)
The article states:[12]
IV. His Most Christian Majesty renounces all pretensions which he has heretofore formed or might
have formed to Nova Scotia or Acadia in all its parts, and guaranties the whole of it, and with all
its dependencies, to the King of Great Britain: Moreover, his Most Christian Majesty cedes and
guaranties to his said Britannick Majesty, in full right, Canada, with all its dependencies, as well
as the island of Cape Breton, and all the other islands and coasts in the gulph and river of St.
Lawrence, and in general, every thing that depends on the said countries, lands, islands, and coasts,
with the sovereignty, property, possession, and all rights acquired by treaty, or otherwise, which
the Most Christian King and the Crown of France have had till now over the said countries, lands,
islands, places, coasts, and their inhabitants, so that the Most Christian King cedes and makes over
the whole to the said King, and to the Crown of Great Britain, and that in the most ample manner
and form, without restriction, and without any liberty to depart from the said cession and guaranty
under any pretence, or to disturb Great Britain in the possessions above mentioned. His Britannick
Majesty, on his side, agrees to grant the liberty of the Catholick religion to the inhabitants of
Canada: he will, in consequence, give the most precise and most effectual orders, that his new
Roman Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion according to the rites of the
Romish church, as far as the laws of Great Britain permit. His Britannick Majesty farther agrees,
that the French inhabitants, or others who had been subjects of the Most Christian King in Canada,
may retire with all safety and freedom wherever they shall think proper, and may sell their estates,
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provided it be to the subjects of his Britannick Majesty, and bring away their effects as well as
their persons, without being restrained in their emigration, under any pretence whatsoever, except
that of debts or of criminal prosecutions: The term limited for this emigration shall be fixed to the
space of eighteen months, to be computed from the day of the exchange of the ratification of the
present treaty.
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